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1. Introduction 
Studies devoted to evaluating the impact of educational interventions have expanded notably 
worldwide over the last two decades. There are two factors explaining this. On the one hand, the 
availability of new, high quality, national and international data. On the other, the development 
of innovative and sophisticated methods capable of confronting the principal methodological 
problems facing this kind of studies. These factors have created new opportunities for 
academics to conduct research that addresses policymakers’ concerns about the consequences of 
actions directed at improving educational outcomes (Murname and Willet, 2011). 
One of the subjects that has focused the empirical work of many educational economists has 
been the public funding of privately run schools. The evaluation of the impact of this policy, 
widely applied under different guises (vouchers, charter schools, publicly subsidised private 
schools, busing), has been boosted in the last ten years by the potential that the innovative 
techniques of causal inference have in the analysis of such a controversial question. These 
methodologies, clustered under the rubric of Propensity Score Analysis (PSA) by Guo and 
Fraser (2010), have proved themselves to be extremely useful in the analysis of causal effects in 
non-experimental studies, that is to say in settings in which the values of all variables (including 
those describing participation in different potential treatments) are observed rather than assigned 
by an external agent (Shadish et al., 2002). 
In this paper we use one of these techniques, propensity score matching (PSM), in order to 
evaluate the effect of attending a publicly subsidised private school (hereinafter PrSPS) on some 
of the educational skills promoted by Spanish primary schools. These PrSPS are privately 
owned and managed but financed by the regional government. Research into this topic is 
extremely important in Spain, where two models of school management (public and private) 
coexist and compete for limited public resources. Although advocates of each of these models 
usually invoke arguments of quality, efficiency or even social equality in order to defend their 
preferred option, technical studies comparing the performance of public and privately run 
schools are so far inconclusive (Toma and Zimmer, 2012). These contradictory results prevent 
the identification of the optimal model of educational management (public versus private). Our 
study makes a further contribution to this controversial issue. 
The data used in this paper come from a national evaluation project established for the 2006 
Spanish Education Act (LOE): the Evaluación de Diagnóstico (hereinafter ED), which contains 
a wealth of information about the socioeconomic context of students and the scores they attain 
in a standardized external test in the fourth grade. The study specifically concentrates on the 
Spanish region of Aragon, arguing that the region’s funding, governance arrangements and 
student populations make PrSPS and public schools (hereinafter PuS) more readily comparable 
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than in a larger area. Data were collected in 2010 and were provided by the Local Educational 
Authority of the region of Aragon, which is responsible for the implementation of the ED in 
their district.  
Our methodological strategy is defined by the sequential application of two methods: propensity 
score matching (PSM) and hierarchical linear models (HLM). The first of these will allow us to 
circumscribe a reduced and homogeneous sample of students attending PrSPS and PuS. The 
application of HLM to this reduced sample of students will allow us to be more accurate in the 
estimation of the effect of the PrSPS on the educational skills evaluated in the ED. Additionally; 
we also test the sensitivity of our estimates with respect to unobserved heterogeneity.  
Our results underline the existence of a certain advantage of the publicly subsidised private 
school (PrSPS) of Aragon compared to the public schools (PuS) in some educational 
competencies, in particular those related to the dominance of abilities in solving problems and 
questions related to scientific skills. In the case of competencies in Foreign Language (English), 
the second competence evaluated in the 2010 edition of the ED, the study performed does not 
permit the establishment of statistically significant relationships between school type and the 
skills acquired by Aragonese pupils in that cognitive dimension. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes recent 
research in this area. In section 3 we provide a description of the data used and the institutional 
setting. Section 4 expounds the methodological strategy employed to identify the effect of 
PrSPS on educational achievement. In section 5 we present the results of our estimations. The 
paper concludes with a summary of our findings in section 6.  
 
2. Background 
The origin of research into the effect of school type (private or public) on educational 
performance is usually attributed to the controversial work of Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore 
(1982). In this report, Coleman and his colleagues performed a multidimensional comparison of 
North American public and private schools (Catholic and non-Catholic) from the data supplied 
by the High School and Beyond project. Of all the questions dealt with in the report, those 
which had greatest media and academic impact were those concerned the comparison of the 
results obtained by pupils in public and private Catholic schools in standardised tests to evaluate 
basic cognitive skills (reading, writing and mathematics). Their conclusions, favourable to 
private schools (PrS, hereinafter), led to a prolific line of research which has lasted until today 
and which has been directed at overcoming the methodological limitations attributed to the 
work of Coleman and to testing his results in diverse educational contexts.  
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The principal deficiencies attributed to the above study were centred on the methodology used 
to discern the effect of PrS upon the cognitive results of pupils: multiple regression analysis 
(ordinary least squares, hereinafter OLS) with a set of carefully selected covariates representing 
the parents’ socioeconomic status and other ‘background characteristics’2 of students. Coleman 
et al. (1982) believed that controlling for important pre-existing differences between PuS and 
PrS’ students and their families allowed them to overcome the selection bias that threatened 
their estimations3. Subsequent methodological advances have made clear, however, that the 
OLS estimate of the parameter () of the main predictor (school type), even when incorporating 
a high number of covariates, will be a biased estimate of the population’s average treatment 
effect (ATE). This is due to the infringement of one of the main assumptions of the OLS 
method, namely that the residuals are completely unrelated to any predictors included in the 
regression model.  
On the basis of this fact, in recent decades there have emerged a considerable number of studies 
which have attempted to correct this problem of heterogeneity employing diverse 
methodological strategies (IV, matching techniques, differences in differences or child fixed 
effects4). The results of the application of these strategies in order to evaluate the impact that 
PrS have on student achievement are so far inconclusive. While a number of studies in various 
settings find that PrS outperform traditional PuS (Bedi and Garg, 2000, Morgan, 2001, Anand, 
Mizala and Repetto, 2009, Lefebvre et al., 2011, Kim, 2011, Crespo and Santin, 2014), other 
research has found that student performance attending PrS is not statistically different from that 
of students in PuS (McEwan, 2001, Bettinger, 2005, Jepsen, 2003, Betts et al., 2006, Witte et al, 
2007, Mancebón and Muñíz, 2008, Chudgar and Quin, 2012). Finally, other studies have 
concluded that PrS perform worse than PuS (Bifulco and Laad, 2006, Pfeffermann and 
Landsman, 201, Mancebón et al. 2012).  
In other cases, the effect encountered varies by subject (Altonji et al., 2008, Imberman, 2011, 
Zimmer et al., 2012, Davies, 2013), by type of student (Gronberg and Jansen, 2001) or by 
estimator (Davies, 2013). To these studies must be added those which have shown that the 
effects of school type vary over time (Sass, 2006, Booker et al., 2007, Hanushek et al., 2007) 
                                                          
2 For a detailed study of the controversy created by the study by Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore, see number 51(4) of 
the Harvard Educational Review or number 55(2) of Sociology of Education. 
3 This bias has its origin in the fact that attendance at a school, whether private or public, is not random but instead is 
conditioned by characteristics of the family surroundings, which in turn are extremely important in the determination 
of educational outputs (the family socioeconomic level, for example).  
4 For a detailed review of the methodological developments and state-of-the art applications of methods to estimate 
treatment effects when the main predictor is endogenous, see the special issue on estimation of treatment effects in 
Empirical Economics (Fitzenberger et al., 2013). 
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and those which s fail to find a consistently positive (or negative) effect of religious schools on 
overall area-wide educational performance (Allen and Vignoles, 2015). 
To summarise, the empirical evidence makes clear that the type of influence exercised by the 
ownership and management of the educational centre on academic results is an open question 
which requires the performance of additional empirical analyses to those undertaken so far. As 
Davies states (2013, p.880): “As debates over school choice become increasingly transnational, 
we need studies from a variety of settings to build a stockpile of international knowledge about 
school sectors and student achievement”. In this context, our study constitutes a contribution 
aimed at shedding new light on an as yet unclosed debate.  
 
3. Data and institutional background 
One of the defining characteristics of the schooling system in Spain is its dual nature, consisting 
of predominantly public sector provision but with a substantial private sector. The largest 
segment of the latter are represented by PrSPS, that is to say schools publicly financed by 
regional education authorities but privately owned and managed5. The distribution of students 
enrolled in primary education among different school types in Spain in 2010 was as follows: 
67.44% of students attended a PuS, 28.5% a PrSPS and 4.03% to completely private 
independent schools (Spanish Ministry of Education, 2013). In this paper, we focus on 
comparing the performance of PuS and PrSPS in order to evaluate the role of the management 
model (public versus private) in the promotion of educational skills6. 
Our empirical study employs census data for primary students in the fourth grade in the Spanish 
region of Aragon in 2010. These data come from the Evaluación de Diagnóstico (ED), a 
national evaluation of the educational skills of pupils established by the Spanish Education Act 
(LOE) in 2006 and administered by regional authorities. The ED is involved in the evaluation of 
several educational competencies that rotate every two years: Spanish; Maths; Science; Digital 
Skills, Foreign Language, Social Interaction and Citizenship, Arts, Learning by Oneself and 
Personal Autonomy. In 2010, the second year of the application of the ED, the competencies 
evaluated were Science and Foreign Language (English). In addition to the assessment of 
pupils’ skills, the ED includes data on a wide range of characteristics. These include basic 
demographics (gender, age, immigration status, etc.) but also information on children’s 
socioeconomic background (parents’ occupational status, parents’ years of schooling, household 
possessions, etc.), data on the academic profile of students (if the child has repeated any 
                                                          
5 This occurs through the 1985 Right to Education Act (LODE). For a detailed description and historical evolution of 
the Spanish non-higher education system, see Bernal, 2005. 
6 Green et al. (2004) offer an explanation of the principal differences which exist between Spanish PuS and PrSPS. 
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academic year, if he or she needs help in doing homework, the daily time devoted to study , 
etc.) and data on parents’ involvement in education, on perceptions of students of themselves 
and the class environment and satisfaction with the school. Table 1 includes the descriptive 
statistics of all the variables drawn from the ED of 2010, grouped by school type (PuS and 
PrSPS).  
Table 1 shows higher raw results for PrSPS students in the two evaluated educational skills in 
2010 (Science and Foreign Language - English)7. But raw differences are insufficient to judge 
the relative quality of PuS versus PrSPS because they do not take into account the differences 
between students attending each type of school. This is due to the fact that school choice is not 
exogenous but instead fruit of an individual/family decision, determined by diverse household 
characteristics such as income and wealth, sociocultural profile etc. (Mancebón and Pérez-
Ximénez de Embún, 2014, Burgess and Briggs, 2010, Gallego and Hernando, 2010, Escardibul 
and Villarroya, 2009 or Tamm, 2008, among others). 
This is shown in Table 1, which demonstrates that PrSPS have a much more select student body 
than PuS. This is true for variables such as parents’ occupational status, parents’ years of 
schooling, household possessions, the immigration status of pupils, parents’ involvement in 
education, students’ motivation and so on. The differences between PuS and PrSPS are all 
statistically significant in all these dimensions, a result which mirrors the conclusions reached 
by other studies which have analysed this topic in Spain with distinct databases. (Mancebón et 
al., 2012; Calero and Escardibul, 2007; Doncel et al., 2012). In summary, Table 1 underlines 
the need to apply in our study an estimation strategy which takes into account the differences 
existing between pupils in PuS and PrSPS and permits the identification of the net effect on 
school results attributable to school type. 
 
[Insert table 1 around here] 
 
4. Research strategy  
When evaluating the impact of PrSPS on students’ educational outcomes it is important to take 
into consideration certain restrictions of the methodological type which affect our study. 
                                                          
7 The average score of each competence for the total number of schools is 500 and the standard deviation 100, given 
that as established by the General Report on Diagnostic Evaluation in Aragon 2010 “the evaluation of each 
competence in Aragon as a whole is established at the level of the average scores transformed into a reference value 
which has been fixed at 500, with a standard deviation of 100”. Here, the approach of the Spanish Diagnostic 
Evaluation is similar to that of the evaluations of the PISA Project of the OECD. In Table 1 the average score differs 
from 500 due to the elimination from the sample of private schools without public financing and of those situated in 
municipalities in which there exists no choice between public and private schools.  
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Firstly, the data from ED 2010 have a hierarchical structure, due to the fact that the sample 
selection of individuals occurs at two levels (students and schools). Thus, data are nested. 
Consequently, some of the characteristics of students attending the same school are correlated, 
violating the hypothesis of independence of the observations upon which traditional regression 
models are based. The application of OLS to these data structures produces an underestimation 
of the true standard errors, leading to spurious results (Hox, 1995). 
Secondly, when assessing the impact of school type, it should be noted that in Spain the 
distribution of students is not random but, as noted above, schools are chosen by families8. 
Among other influences, family socioeconomic characteristics constitute one of the main 
determinants of the selection pattern (Escardíbul and Villarroya, 2009; Mancebón and Pérez-
Ximénez de Embún, 2014). The “school type” predictor is therefore an endogenous variable. 
This gives rise to correlations between this predictor and the residuals of the regressions, 
creating biased parameter estimates. This is what Heckman (1979) defined as sample selection 
bias. 
The characteristics described immediately above are the basic factors conditioning the empirical 
strategy employed here. This strategy takes material shape in a two-level analysis. Firstly, a 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) analysis was conducted, in order to define a homogenous 
student subsample in terms of the observable characteristics which may simultaneously 
influence the selection of school type and educational scores. In other words, the PSM analysis 
allows for the creation of a subsample that is not affected by sample selection bias in 
observables. In addition, our study also control for the impact of unobservable variables on 
results. To do this, a sensitivity analysis is employed.  
Secondly, a multilevel equation model (HLM) is estimated to allow for the hierarchical 
structure of the data supplied by ED 2010. This model permits differentiation between those 
influences acting on the student and those acting on the school. It is expected that this empirical 
strategy will lead to more accurate estimations and reduced bias. 
In the two following sections we synthetically explain the methodological bases of the two 
techniques to be used in the empirical studies. 
 
4.1. Propensity Score Matching 
Selection bias is a methodological problem inherent to all the impact evaluations that use data 
from administrative records (such as ED). This problem is related to the bias associated to the 
pre-treatment differences between treated and non-treated individuals (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
                                                          
8 LODE (1985): Organic Law 8/1985, 3 July, regulating Education. Official Spanish State Bulletin 159. 
7
2008) and arises where the assignment of participants to evaluated treatment is not random. This 
situation is widespread in educational research and is the main econometric problem 
encountered when trying to measure the effect of privately run schools on the academic 
performance of children (Lefebvre et al., 2011).  
The search for research designs and analytic strategies to confront this problem had led to 
innovative methods originated in the econometrics and statistical fields (for an extensive review 
of these approaches, see Fitzenberger et al., 2013). One of the most popular methods to cope 
with the possible occurrence of selection bias in observational studies is propensity score 
matching (PSM) which is erected upon the Neyman-Rubin counterfactual conceptual 
framework (Neyman, 1923, Rubin, 1974 and 1978). 
As is well known, a counterfactual is a theoretical construction that refers to a potential 
outcome, that is to say to what would have happened to a treated individual if (s)he had not 
received treatment, ceteris paribus. From a theoretical point of view, the counterfactual renders 
the process of causal inference trivial, because if the value of the counterfactual is established 
for each person treated, the individual treatment effect (ITE) for this person can be easily 
evaluated by comparing their real and potential outcomes. The average of these ITEs across all 
participants in the evaluated treatment would allow the estimation of the average treatment 
effect (ATT) for the individuals treated. Finally, the application of a statistical test, such as the t-
test, would permit evaluation of whether the ATT is extrapolated to the population from which 
the participants have been sampled (Murname and Willett, 2011). 
The fundamental evaluation problem from an empirical point of view arises because the 
counterfactual is by nature non-observable. At this point the challenge is to find an analytical 
strategy to proxy the counterfactuals. The contribution of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to this 
task is extremely valuable. In particular, these authors propose a semiparametric methodology, 
known as Propensity Score Matching (hereinafter PSM), to deal with the possible occurrence of 
selection bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
The purpose of PSM is to proxy a credible value of the counterfactual for each of the 
individuals belonging to the treatment group (hereinafter TG). To accomplish this aim it is 
necessary to take into account that the only information available regarding the performance 
achieved without treatment is that corresponding to non-treated individuals (hereinafter control 
group or CG). Given this consideration, the problem to overcome is to find a procedure that 
allows the TG and CG to be balanced in all the characteristics relevant to the production of 
outcomes. The principal advantage of the PSM resides in its capacity to perform matchings 
between the individuals from the TG and CG when the number of covariates (X) is numerous.  
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The matchings proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) are not performed upon the original 
variables, but instead upon a single magnitude, the propensity score (ps, hereinafter), which 
synthesizes all the information contained in the X control variables which simultaneously 
influence participation in the treatment evaluated and in the outcomes under study. The ps is 
calculated via a logistic regression model or a similar tool and represents the conditional 
probability of participating in the evaluated intervention of each individual in the sample, given 
their observable characteristics X, that is to say: 
ps = P(W = 1 | X)    (1) 
This magnitude has a very special value in the correction of the selection bias, since the 
matchings performed upon the base of the ps permit the delimitation of a subsample formed by 
all the individuals from the TG and those from the CG which are similar in all the observable 
characteristics that may affect the outcome evaluated. This avoids the differences between the 
results from each group being contaminated by the differences in the observable characteristics 
of the members of each group (unconfoundedness).  
The key to PSM functioning lies in the creation of good matching, namely in finding the CG 
individuals having a ps similar to that of the TG individuals. In other words, finding i  
W=1one (some) j  W=0 such that Pi(W=1) Pj(W=1). This requires that P(W=1 | X)< 1 and 
P(W=1 | X)>0 X. The fulfilment of these two relationships ensures that the two groups (TG 
and CG) contain similar individuals regarding observable characteristics (known as the common 
support assumption). In formal terms, the challenge of this technique resides in finding i  W 
= 1 those j  W = 0, such that psi  psj, where W = 1 indicates participation in the treatment 
evaluated. 
The matching process may be conducted using different algorithms. Guo and Fraser (2010) 
offer a detailed description of the topic. Several of these algorithms will be used in our 
empirical work to test the sensitivity of our estimates to the algorithm employed. 
Having selected the subsample of comparable individuals, the following step in the PSM is to 
calculate the estimator of the average treatment effect for treated individuals (ATT or average 
treatment effect for treated), which is then defined as: 
         (2) 
where the match subindex indicates that the estimations refer to the subsample delimited via the 
PSM, W is the indicator of the group of individuals compared (treatment group:W=1 and 
control group W=0) and Y indicates the outcome of each group. 
In this way an estimation is obtained of the effect of the intervention W upon the outcomes (Y), 
liberated from the problem of selection bias in observables.  
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 4.2. Hierarchical Linear Models 
As just indicated, the application of the PSM permits availability of debugged estimations of the 
ATT with regard to the observable variables (X) which distinguish the members of the TG and 
the CG and which are potentially important in the determination of outcomes (Y). 
However, the potential influences on the educational results include, usually, more variables 
than those which simultaneously influence participation in a concrete educational intervention, 
that is to say those considered in the construction of the ps. Given this situation, the calculation 
of the net effect of an intervention, such as W, in the educational context requires the contrast of 
the influence of those other factors (X) which are potentially important in the determination of 
Y. For this it is fundamental to realize a post-matching analysis. This will provide greater 
precision in the estimation of the effect of the treatment. Three types of influence deserve 
attention: the characteristics of the schools at which individuals are educated, the attributes of 
the students not incorporated into the calculation of the propensity score (those contemporary to 
the receipt of the treatment) and the differences between the individuals from the TG and CG in 
unobservable variables. 
The testing of the importance of the first two characteristics (the characteristics of schools and 
characteristics of the pupils not taken into account in the calculation of the propensity score) can 
be performed via a regression model on the matched sample. In effect, insofar as the subsample 
delimited via the PSM is not affected by the problem of selection bias in observables which 
affected the original sample, the regression analysis is now pertinent when identifying the effect 
of the intervention W upon the results.  
With regard to the evaluation of the importance which the unobservable factors may have upon                                                                               
the results obtained, the analysis requires from the performance a sensitivity analysis such as 
that proposed by Altonji et al. (2008) and Rosenbaum, (2002). In section 5.1.3 we shall explain 
and apply its approach. In what remains of the current section, the foundations of the regression 
model to be applied in our study will be expounded. On this point, we should underline that our 
selection of the ideal regression model to conduct our estimates was conditioned by peculiarities 
of the ED data. 
Of all the available regression models, the HLM adapt best to these peculiarities. Their main 
advantage is that they permit differentiation between those influences acting at the student level 
(first level of analysis) and those acting at the class and school level (second and third levels). 
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They are, therefore, models which are especially appropriate for working with data nested at 
various levels, such as those supplied by almost all educational databases, including ED9.  
These models permit the analysis of variables acting at different levels (individuals, classes and 
schools, for example) and they allow the identification of the proportion of the total variance of 
an outcome attributed to each of the specified levels. In analytical terms, the level 1 (student) 
equation is determined as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝜋0𝑗𝑘 + ∑ 𝜋𝑝𝑗𝑘𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑘
𝑃
𝑝=1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘  𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)     (3) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the expected result from the individual i in the class j in the school k; 𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑘 is a 
level 1 explanatory variable for the individual i in the class j in the school k, 𝜋𝑝𝑗𝑘 are the level 1 
coefficients (p=0,1,…,P) and 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the level 1 random effect which is assumed to follow a 
normal distribution. At level 2 (classes), the 𝜋 coefficients are treated as variables to be 
estimated, and thus we have: 
𝜋𝑝𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽𝑝0𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑝𝑞𝑘𝑋𝑞𝑗𝑘
𝑄𝑝
𝑞=1 + 𝑟𝑝𝑗𝑘      (4) 
where 𝛽𝑝𝑞𝑘 (q=0,1,…,Qp) are the level 2 coefficients, 𝑋𝑞𝑗𝑘 is a level 2 predictor and 𝑟𝑝𝑗𝑘 is a 
random effect. It is assumed that for each unit j the vector (𝑟0𝑗𝑘 , 𝑟1𝑗𝑘, … , 𝑟𝑃𝑗𝑘)’ is distributed 
according to a normal distribution in which each element has an average of zero and a 
covariance matrix Τ𝜋 with a maximum dimension of (P+1)x(P+1). Each of the level 2 
coefficients, 𝛽𝑝𝑞𝑘, are converted into the variables to be explained at level 3 (school): 
𝛽𝑝𝑞𝑘 = 𝛾𝑝𝑞0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑝𝑞𝑠𝑊𝑠𝑘
𝑆𝑝𝑞
𝑠=1 + 𝑢𝑝𝑞𝑘  (5) 
where 𝛾𝑝𝑞𝑠 (s=0,1,…,Spq) are the level 3 coefficients, 𝑊𝑠𝑘 is a level 3 predictor and 𝑢𝑝𝑞𝑘 is a 
level 3 random effect. It is assumed that the vector of random effects is distributed as a normal 
distribution in which each element has a mean of zero and a covariance matrix Τ𝛽 with the 
following maximum dimension: ∑ (𝑄𝑝 + 1)
𝑝
𝑝=0 × ∑ (𝑄𝑝 + 1).
𝑝
𝑝=0  
 
5. Empirical results 
This section presents the principal results obtained from the empirical analysis performed. 
Firstly, the estimations obtained from the application of the PSM are commented upon. Next, 
we expound the principal contributions to these estimations offered by the application of the 
HLM. 
                                                          
9 Bryk and Raudenbusch (1988) recommend the use of this type of general model when analysing the effects of 
schools on educational outcomes. There exist multiple applications of this methodology to the educational context. 
Among these are Willms (2006), Somers et al. (2004) and Mancebón et al. (2012), the last of these being applied to 
Spanish data from PISA 2006. 
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5.1. PSM Results 
5.1.1. Estimation of the Propensity Score Model 
The strategy for estimating the PSM takes concrete shape, as explained in the previous section, 
by finding a group of students from PrSPS which is comparable with the students who attend a 
PuS in all those variables which can potentially condition the choice of school and the scores 
obtained of good marks in the competences evaluated in the ED. The selection equation must 
first be estimated, that is to say, the equation which permits the propensity score (ps) to be 
predicted must be constructed and, secondly, the sample of pupils belonging to the TG and CG 
in this indicator must be balanced. The estimation of the selection equation is of decisive 
importance, since it affects both balance on propensity scores and the final estimate of the 
treatment effect. A crucial point in the specification of this equation is that only the variables 
which affect both school choice and academic performance must be included. In addition, only 
those regressors which are potential predictors of educational outcomes and which occur prior 
to the choice of school (or were stable between the time of the choice of school and the time of 
the outcome assessment) should be included as explanatory variables (Caliendo and Kopeining, 
2008).  
Econometric literature offers various methods of estimation of the conditional probability of 
receiving a treatment (in our case, of attending a PrSPS): logistic regression, probit model, 
linear-probability function and discriminant analysis (Murname and Willett, 2011). In our study 
we have opted to use a logistic regression model, and specifically a generalized boosted model 
(GBM). The key feature and advantage of this model is that the analyst does not need to specify 
functional forms of the predictor variables. In addition, GBM permits nonlinear and interaction 
effects to be captured (McCaffrey, 2004). Finally, the data-adaptive algorithm on which this 
method is grounded leads to estimations of the ps that balance the observable covariates of the 
TG and CG10. For this reason GBM constitutes a highly suitable model to be used in the context 
of the PSM (Chowa et al., 2013). 
A very important issue that should not be overlooked in interpreting the results of a GBM is that 
it does not provide estimated regression coefficients such as s. Instead it provides influence, 
which is the percentage of log likelihood explained by each input variable11. 
Bearing in mind these premises, the specification of the GBM which was applied in our study 
included in the estimation those variables from the databases which, in the light of the previous 
empirical evidence regarding the determinants of school choice and the determinants of school 
                                                          
10 This is due to the fact that the adjustment it supplies is that which minimizes the average standardized absolute 
mean difference (ASAM) between the individuals from the TG and CG. 
11 See Guo and Fraser (2010), page 144. 
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results, could simultaneously affect the choice of PrSPS and academic performance. That is to 
say, when specifying the selection equation no consideration is taken of either the variables 
which can potentially contribute to explaining the differences in the cognitive competences 
evaluated in the diagnostic test, but which do not influence the choice of school (study habits, 
for example), nor those which could be determinants of that choice but do not influence the 
competences cited (the distance to the centre, for example). 
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of the selection equation12. It can be observed that 
the variables which capture the greatest degree of influence in the probability of attending a 
PrSPS are the years of study of the mother and father (16 and 21%, respectively), followed by 
the variables which proxy the degree of possessions in the household (number of TVs, PCs, 
video game consoles, MP4s, study room). The influence of the employment of the parents is 
also important. The dummies which approximate the employment of the mother account for 
5.7% and those of the father 10.6%. Although the R2 obtained is low, in these models the 
percentage of correct predictions of the model estimated is more important; in our case this 
reaches practically 70%, which the literature considers to be a fairly high degree of reliability. 
The final part of the table shows various parameters used in the estimation of the GBM models.  
Figures 1 and 2a show the distribution of the predictions of the propensity scores estimated for 
the individuals from PuS and PrSPS. It can be clearly observed, in both the boxplot and the 
distribution graph, that there is a very broad area of common support. In other words, 
individuals in the TG have individuals in the CG with whom they can be compared, as their ps 
scores are the same. 
 
[Insert table 2 around here] 
 
[Insert figures 1 and 2 around here] 
 
5.1.2. Matching and resampling estimation 
After estimating the ps the matching process is then undertaken. Various algorithms can be 
found in the literature regarding the performance of this process: greedy matching, optimal 
matching and fine balance (Guo and Fraser, 2010). The present study uses the first of these, 
which may be applied via a range of variants (Smith and Tood, 2005). The two most commonly 
used algorithms are nearest neighbour matching (hereinafter NNM), which allows for diverse 
                                                          
12 In the estimations those individuals with data missing from the variables have been eliminated, following a case-
wise deletion procedure. 
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variants, and methods based on kernel functions (hereinafter KM). The first of these matches 
each individual from the TG with that from the CG having the most similar ps value. KM 
constructs matches using all the individuals in the potential control sample in such a way that it 
gathers more information from those who are closer matches and less from distant observations. 
In so doing, KM uses comparatively more information than other matching algorithms (Guo and 
Fraser, 2010, chapter 7). The present study applied these two algorithms, as well as several of 
the options permitted by NNM (with and without replacement, with caliper and without caliper, 
1 to 1, 1 to 2 and 1 to 3). The KM, in turn, was applied with different bandwidths. This was 
done in an attempt to test the sensitivity of the matching to the different estimation methods. 
The analysis led us to opt for the Epanechnikov kernel type KM with a bandwidth of 0.03, since 
it best equates the individuals from the TG and the CG13. The sample was only reduced by 9 
individuals from the CG who were not paired with any individual from the TG. The remaining 
individuals from the CG were weighted on the basis of the number of times that they were 
matched with individuals from the TG. These weights were required to be used in the 
subsequent analyses.  
Figure 2b displays the distribution of the ps in the original sample and in the matched 
subsample. In the latter, it is observable that there is an almost perfect overlap in the distribution 
for public schools and PrSPS. Figure 3 shows the matching used between students from PuS 
and PrSPS14. 
 
[Insert figure 3 around here] 
 
Table 3 compares the scores in Science and Foreign Language (English) for the unmatched and 
matched samples (ATT). It shows that in the two samples PrSPS have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on both Sciences and Foreign Language (English) scores for students 
evaluated in ED 2010. 
 
[Insert table 3 around here] 
 
                                                          
13 Results supplied by the different matching estimation methods led to similar conclusions. They are not supplied 
here but are available from the authors upon request. 
14 The Annex presents other results obtained from the implementation of the PSM. In particular, Table A.1. shows the 
differences in averages in the ps and the covariates for the complete sample and the paired sample, and similarly the 
reduction in the bias achieved. Figure A.1. shows graphically the pre- and post-matching bias for each of the 
variables. Figure A.2. depicts the distribution of the variables used in the PSM by type of school for the complete 
sample (figures on the left) and the matched sample (figures on the right). 
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5.1.3. Sensitivity analysis: selection on unobservables  
The matching method approach is based on the conditional independence (CIA), which states 
that the researcher should observe all variables simultaneously influencing the participation 
decision and outcome variables. If there unobserved variables, which simultaneously affect 
assignment into treatment and the outcome variable, a “hidden bias” might arise to which 
matching estimators are not robust. In this section a sensitivity analysis is undertaken in order to 
evaluate to what extend are our results robust to a potential imbalance in the unobservable 
factors across matching blocks of observations. 
The idea is scrutinize the estimated management effects to see whether they are sensitive to 
selection bias due to correlation between unobserved factors and a person treatment status. 
Although we have many background variables, treatment effect in nonexperimental studies may 
be contaminated with selection bias due to unobserved factors like motivation, ability, 
preferences, etc. The purpose of sensitivity analysis is to ask whether inferences about the 
management effects may be altered by factors not observed in the data (Aakvik, 2001; Hujer et 
al., 2004; Caliendo et al., 2005; Altonji et al., 2008). 
In order to estimate the extent to which such "selection on unobservables" may bias our 
qualitative and quantitative inferences about the effects of the typology of the school, we 
present the results from using Rosenbaum’s (2002) procedure for bounding the treatment effect 
estimates in Table 4. 
There we give the results of the p-value from Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for the averaged 
treatment effect on the treated while setting the level of hidden bias to a certain value γ, which 
reflects our assumption about unmeasured heterogeneity or endogeneity in treatment assignment 
expressed in terms of the odds ratio of differential treatment assignment due to an unobserved 
covariate15. At each γ we calculate a hypothetical significance level “p-value critical”, which 
represents the bound on the significance level of the treatment effect in the case of endogenous 
self-selection into treatment status. 
Table 4 shows that robustness to hidden bias varies across the two variables. The finding of a 
positive effect of private management on Science is the least robust to the possible presence of 
selection bias. The critical level of γ at which we would have to question our conclusion of a 
positive effect is between 1.12 and 1.15, i.e. is attained if an unobserved covariate caused the 
odds ratio of treatment assignment to differ between treatment and control cases by a factor of 
about 1.15. For Foreign Language model it would require a hidden bias of γ between 1.30 and 
1.33 to render spurious the conclusion of a positive benefit effect on publicly subsidised private 
school. 
                                                          
15 For a mathematical demonstration, see DiPrete and Gangl (2004). 
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 [Insert table 4 around here] 
 
A critical value of 1.15 suggests that individuals with the same X-vector differ in their odds of 
participation by a factor of 1.15 or 15%. It is important to note that these are worst-case 
scenarios. Hence, a critical value of 1.15 does not mean that unobserved heterogeneity exists 
and that there is no effect of treatment on the outcome variable. This result only states that the 
confidence interval for the effect would include zero if an unobserved variable caused the odds 
ratio of treatment assignment to differ between treatment and comparison groups by 1.15. 
Additionally, this variable's effect on the outcome would have to be so strong that it almost 
perfectly determines the outcome in each pair of matched cases in the data. However, even if 
there is unobserved heterogeneity to a degree of 15% in the group of Science, inference about 
the treatment effect would not be changed. 
To repeat, the Rosenbaum bounds are in this sense a “worst-case” scenario. Nonetheless, they 
convey important information about the level of uncertainty contained in matching estimators 
by showing just how large the influence of a confounding variable must be to undermine the 
conclusions of a matching analysis. As a conclusion, this analysis allows confirm that only a 
large amount of unobserved heterogeneity would alter the inference about the estimated effects. 
Even so, always is necessary has some caution when interpreting the results. 
 
5.2. Postmatching analysis: HLM results 
The analysis performed in the two previous sections has permitted the delimitation of a 
subsample unaffected by the problem of selection bias which affected the initial sample. From 
this, it has been possible to perform an initial estimation of the impact of attending a PrSPS 
upon the educational achievements of pupils (Table 3). This estimation has taken into 
consideration the educational results of the individuals belonging to the TG and CG, once the 
effect of the covariates which jointly determine PrSPS attendance and children’s cognitive 
development has been discounted. However, students’ cognitive skills are also influenced by 
other variables which do not affect their participation in the treatment and which, as a result, 
have not been included in the estimation of the ps. This is why a more precise estimation of the 
effect than that offered by the comparison of the scores for the unmatched and matched samples 
(ATT) would require a refined approach which took into account the variables which may 
influence the evaluated skills but have not been included in the PSM. Consequently, a post-
matching analysis was undertaken, the results of which are shown below. 
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As previously explained, the regression model best fitting the data supplied by the ED 2010 is a 
hierarchical lineal model (HLM). This type of model, as we said earlier, permits the 
identification of the proportion of the total variance of the outcomes obtained by students which 
may be attributed to the different estimation levels. In our case, level 1 is represented by the 
student, level 2 is represented by the class and level three is represented by the school. 
The appropriateness of applying an HLM is justified empirically by the intra-class correlation 
(ICC) values of the null model of Science and Foreign Language (English) performance (the 
two being the dependent variables of the regression). Tables 5 and 6 show, respectively, these 
values for an HLM at two levels and three levels16.  
As observed, in the model at three levels the ICC for the class level is 12.3% for Sciences and 
4.0% for Foreign Language (English). For level 3 (school) these values are 18.9% and 32.9% 
respectively. These results show that the class level explains a minimal percentage of the 
variance of the results in Foreign Language (English), although this level does explain a higher 
percentage of the results in Sciences. Consequently, it was decided to apply a two-level model 
for achievement in a Foreign Language (English) and a three-level model for Sciences. 
The models were estimated by imposing fixed effects on the parameters (with the exception of 
the independent term), rejecting the null hypothesis that there existed statistically significant 
random effects. The dependent variables in the regression are the marks achieved by fourth 
grade pupils from Aragon in the ED tests for 2010 in Science and Foreign Language (English). 
The predictors of the regression and the results of the HLM are listed in Table 7, grouped by 
levels. The left-hand side of the table presents the results from the two-level model for Foreign 
Language (English). The right-hand side offers the results for the three-level model, more 
adequate for the estimation of the determinants of the outcomes in Science. 
The predictor which has greatest interest in our study is attendance at a PrSPS. It can be 
observed that this effect is positive and significant for Science, while for Foreign Language 
(English) it is not statistically significant. The coefficient estimated in Science is 22 points, 
which indicates that a pupil whose remaining characteristics are identical has a score in this 
competence 22 points higher in a PrSPS than in a PuS. 
With regard to the effects of the covariates included in the regression the following can be 
observed. The size of the municipality in which the school is located and attendance at a school 
in the city of Zaragoza (capital of the Autonomous Community of Aragon) have a significant 
effect upon competence in English. The net effect of attendance at a school situated in the city 
                                                          
16 The intra-class correlation (ICC) is the proportion of the total variance explained by the differences between classes 
(level 2) and between schools (level 3). If the ICC were zero, a hierarchical model would not be necessary, since in 
this case the total variance of the scores would not be explained by the differences existing between students 
attending different classes or schools. 
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of Zaragoza is +15.1617.This result may be explained by the greater effort which in recent years 
has been made in bilingual programmes, which have been concentrated especially in the city of 
Zaragoza. 
The results also underline the non-existence of peer effects for fourth year primary pupils18. 
Only the average years of study of mothers at school level show positive and significant effects 
upon competence in English. The variables at pupil level show results common in the literature 
regarding the determinants of educational performance. Girls obtain better results in the 
competence of Foreign Language (English), while boys stand out in Sciences. The occupation 
and level of education of the parents have the expected effect. Greater occupational and 
educational level (in this case the relevant factor is the mother) mean better results at school in 
both competences. In the case of the variable which approximates the effect of immigration 
(residence in Spain of over 5 years) the effect is that expected in the scientific competences 
(positive and significant), while it is not significant in competences in English. Another variable 
which presents the expected effect is the number of books existing in the household: homes 
which state they have over 100 books affect positively the acquisition of educational 
competencies. To this result must be added a positive and statistically significant effect of 
variable “use of books by the pupil”: pupils who state they frequently read books present better 
academic results. 
 
[Insert tables 5 and 6 around here] 
 
Of the different items used in the ED to approximate family wealth only the number of 
televisions in the home demonstrates a significant influence on results (negative influence). 
The effect shown by the time of dedication to school tasks out of school negatively influences 
performance. Children who declare they dedicate over two hours daily to these tasks display 
worse results than those who dedicate less than two hours. Homework does not appear to 
constitute a good strategy for stimulating the capacities of 10-year-old children. A possible 
interpretation of this effect could be that children who dedicate more time to schoolwork outside 
the classroom are those who have greater learning difficulties. An identical interpretation is 
merited by the results which present the variables of “help with study” and “revision of tasks by 
parents or private teachers”. 
                                                          
17 This value has been calculated as: (Population of Zaragoza   

 (Municipality size)+ 

 (Zaragoza city). 
18 These effects have been shown to be important for high school students. See, for instance, Schneeweis and Winter-
Ebmer (2007) or Schindler (2007), both of them using PISA data. 
18
Attitude, approximated by the variable “I do the tasks”, shows a positive effect in both 
competences but is not significant in English. The case of aptitude, approximated by the 
variable “my homework is correct when we correct it in class”, displays in turn a positive effect 
in the results. 
Additionally, the regression incorporates information regarding three factors extracted from a 
principal components analysis applied to the data concerning the school environment. These 
data proceed from the answers supplied by the pupils evaluated. This analysis permitted us to 
identify three factors that we term RELCEN, SELFCONF and PERCAMB.The first factor 
contains information regarding the evaluation the child makes of his or her school (if the centre 
has cultural and sports activities, if the pupil uses the school’s library, if the installations are 
well cared for, etc.). Factor 2 synthesizes the information offered by variables related to the self-
perception of the pupils’ academic capacity (if pupils understand what they read, if they express 
themselves well, if they write correctly, if they are good at languages, etc.). Factor 3, finally, 
reflects the subjective perceptions of the school environment (if there is a good atmosphere in 
the pupil’s class, if his/her classmates help each other, if the pupil has a good relationship with 
his/her teachers, if the teachers stimulate their pupils, etc). 
The results vary depending on the competence evaluated. While in Foreign Language (English) 
factor 1 presents a positive and significant effect, in Sciences the effect is negative but not 
significant. The other two factors influence in a statistically significant way the two 
competencies: self-confidence (factor 2) positively, while the perception of the school 
atmosphere (factor 3) does so negatively. 
 
[Insert table 7 around here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
The analysis performed in this study has underlined the existence of a certain advantage of the 
publicly subsidised private school (PrSPS) of Aragon compared to the public schools (PuS) in 
some educational competencies, in particular those related to the dominance of abilities in 
solving problems and questions related to scientific skills. Even having taken into consideration 
the differences in the sociocultural background of the pupils attending the two types of school 
(differences which favour the PrSPS) and even controlling the selection bias which potentially 
could contaminate our results, attendance at a PrSPS favours the obtaining of better results in 
scientific testing by Spanish pupils in the Autonomous Community of Aragon. 
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In the case of competencies in Foreign Language (English), the second competence evaluated in 
the 2010 edition of the ED, the study performed does not permit the establishment of 
statistically significant relationships between school type and the skills acquired by Aragonese 
pupils in that cognitive dimension. 
These results, which are shown to be relatively robust to bias arising from unobserved driving 
school selection, simply evidence the difficulty of establishing a clear causal effect between the 
school management model and academic achievements. In effect, we began our study by 
underlining the lack of consensus existing in the literature on the differential quality of the PuS 
and PrSPS, finding studies with contradictory conclusions. Our study is a new contribution to 
this field; it has shown that in certain educational competencies (Sciences) PrSPS present 
advantages, while in others (English) the contributions of this type of school are similar to those 
of PuS. Our results, in line with those obtained by Zimmer et al. (2012) and Imberman (2011), 
point towards a possible specialisation of primary schools in certain cognitive skills. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Average differences based on school type for the variables in the pre- and post-
matching samples and bias reduction 
    Mean     t-test 
Variable    Treated Control  %bias %reduct |bias|  t p>|t| 
Propensity score Unmatched  0.47 0.40  60.8   24.87 0.00 
 Matched  0.47 0.47  0.9 98.5  0.32 0.75 
JobMum1 Unmatched  0.37 0.24  29.7   12.15 0.00 
 Matched  0.37 0.37  0.7 97.6  0.26 0.80 
JobMum2 Unmatched  0.39 0.42  -5.4   -2.20 0.03 
 Matched  0.39 0.40  -2.0 62.5  -0.77 0.44 
JobMum3 Unmatched  0.03 0.04  -7.6   -3.06 0.00 
 Matched  0.03 0.03  -1.7 77.5  -0.71 0.48 
JobMum4 Unmatched  0.21 0.30  -21.7   -8.74 0.00 
 Matched  0.21 0.20  2.3 89.6  0.93 0.36 
JobDad1 Unmatched  0.49 0.31  36.7   14.98 0.00 
 Matched  0.49 0.50  -1.2 96.8  -0.44 0.66 
JobDad2 Unmatched  0.23 0.26  -6.5   -2.61 0.01 
 Matched  0.23 0.24  -2.0 68.8  -0.77 0.44 
JobDad3 Unmatched  0.23 0.35  -27.5   -11.07 0.00 
 Matched  0.23 0.21  3.4 87.8  1.38 0.17 
JobDad4 Unmatched  0.05 0.07  -10.7   -4.29 0.00 
 Matched  0.05 0.05  -0.3 97.2  -0.13 0.90 
YearsMum Unmatched  12.34 10.78  33.9   13.66 0.00 
 Matched  12.34 12.49  -3.2 90.7  -1.26 0.21 
YearsDad Unmatched  12.34 10.78  33.5   13.53 0.00 
 Matched  12.34 12.47  -2.9 91.4  -1.13 0.26 
ZonaGeo1 Unmatched  0.91 0.84  21.0   8.36 0.00 
 Matched  0.91 0.91  0.9 95.8  0.38 0.70 
ZonaGeo2 Unmatched  0.00 0.01  -9.3   -3.65 0.00 
 Matched  0.00 0.00  1.0 89.4  0.60 0.55 
ZonaGeo3 Unmatched  0.01 0.01  -1.0   -0.42 0.68 
 Matched  0.01 0.00  2.1 -101.6  0.89 0.37 
ZonaGeo4 Unmatched  0.03 0.06  -12.8   -5.11 0.00 
 Matched  0.03 0.04  -2.5 80.9  -1.06 0.29 
ZonaGeo5 Unmatched  0.04 0.06  -10.9   -4.36 0.00 
 Matched  0.04 0.04  0.2 97.8  0.10 0.92 
ZonaGeo6 Unmatched  0.01 0.02  -8.1   -3.19 0.00 
 Matched  0.01 0.01  -0.7 91.8  -0.30 0.76 
NumBooks Unmatched  0.60 0.50  18.7   7.56 0.00 
 Matched  0.60 0.61  -2.0 89.4  -0.76 0.45 
Own bedroom Unmatched  0.96 0.94  8.1   3.23 0.00 
 Matched  0.96 0.96  -1.2 84.9  -0.51 0.61 
Internet Unmatched  0.88 0.84  12.7   5.06 0.00 
 Matched  0.88 0.89  -3.4 73.4  -1.40 0.16 
NumTVs Unmatched  2.15 2.08  9.8   3.96 0.00 
 Matched  2.15 2.15  0.8 92.1  0.30 0.77 
NumPCs Unmatched  1.63 1.49  17.2   6.97 0.00 
 Matched  1.63 1.66  -4.1 76.2  -1.56 0.12 
NumTvPag Unmatched  0.46 0.43  4.5   1.82 0.07 
 Matched  0.46 0.48  -3.4 24.1  -1.24 0.21 
NumConso Unmatched  1.82 1.66  16.3   6.62 0.00 
 Matched  1.82 1.84  -1.9 88.6  -0.71 0.48 
NumMP4 Unmatched  1.11 0.93  18.3   7.47 0.00 
  Matched   1.11 1.14   -3.0 83.4   -1.11 0.27 
Abs(bias) Unmatched     17.7   617.20 0.00 
  Matched         1.9     31.47 0.09 
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Figure A1. Pre- and post-matching bias between PuS and PrSPS 
Standardised 
 
 
Figure A.2. Distribution of the variables in the unmatched and matched samples 
Mother’s education (years) 
Full sample Matched sample 
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Figure A.2. Distribution of the variables in the unmatched and matched samples (cont.)  
Father’s education (years) 
Full sample Matched sample 
  
Mother’s job 
Full sample Matched sample 
  
Father’s job 
Full sample Matched sample 
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Figure A.2. Distribution of the variables in the unmatched and matched samples (cont.) 
Number of books at home 
Full sample Matched sample 
  
Own bedroom to study 
Full sample Matched sample 
  
Number of TV sets at home 
Full sample Matched sample 
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Figure A.2. Distribution of the variables in the unmatched and matched samples (cont.) 
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Table 1. Mean and test for equality of means and variances by type of school 
   Sig.  
Levene Test 
for equality 
of variances 
Sig. T-test 
for equality 
of means 
   Mean 
Code Description variable Total PuS PrSPS 
SCIENCE 
 
Achievement in Sciences 512.37 501.97 526.27 0.00 0.00 
FOREIGN 
LANGUAGE 
(ENGLISH) 
Achievement in foreign language (English) 513.02 499.18 531.50 0.00 0.00 
JobMum1 Mother white collar highly skilled 0.29 0.24 0.37 0.00 0.00 
JobMum2 Mother white collar low skilled 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.00 0.03 
JobMum3 Mother blue collar high skilled 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 
JobMum4 Mother blue collar low skilled 0.26 0.30 0.21 0.00 0.00 
JobDad1 Father white collar high skilled 0.39 0.31 0.49 0.00 0.00 
JobDad2 Father white collar low skilled 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.00 0.01 
JobDad3 Father blue collar high skilled 0.30 0.35 0.23 0.00 0.00 
JobDad4 Father blue collar low skilled 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
EducationMum Education mother (years) 11.45 10.78 12.34 0.00 0.00 
EducationDad Education father (years) 11.45 10.78 12.34 0.00 0.00 
ZoneGeo1 Student born in Spain 0.87 0.84 0.91 0.00 0.00 
ZoneGeo2 Student born in Africa 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ZoneGeo3 Student born in Asia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.40 0.68 
ZoneGeo4 Student born in Europe 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 
ZoneGeo5 Student born in Latin America 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 
ZoneGeo6 Student born in an Arab country 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
More5years More than 5 years living in Spain 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.00 0.00 
Gender Gender (female=1, male=0) 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.27 0.58 
Repeater 
Student has repeated one or more academic 
years (repeater=1, non-repeater =0) 
0.08 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.00 
NumBooks More than 100 books at home 0.54 0.50 0.60 0.00 0.00 
UseBooks Student uses books frequently 0.72 0.70 0.75 0.00 0.00 
Room Student has own room to study 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.00 0.00 
Internet Internet at home 0.86 0.84 0.88 0.00 0.00 
NumTVs Number of TVs at home 2.11 2.08 2.15 0.01 0.00 
NumPCs Number of computers at home 1.55 1.49 1.63 0.11 0.00 
NumTvPay Number of pay TVs at home 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.00 0.07 
NumVideoGames Number of video games at home 1.73 1.66 1.82 0.16 0.00 
NumMP4 Number of MP$ at home 1.01 0.93 1.11 0.00 0.00 
StudTim0 Less than 2 hours study every day 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.00 0.13 
StudTim1 2 hours study every day 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.05 
StudTim2 More than 2 hours study every day 0.48 0.48 0.48 1.00 1.00 
Needhelp Student needs help in homework 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.59 
RevPar0 Parents do not check either diary or homework 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.00 
RevPar1 Parents check diary but not homework 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.00 
RevPar2 Parents check homework but not diary 0.16 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.00 
RevPar3 Parents check both diary and homework 0.53 0.50 0.57 0.00 0.00 
RevTeacher Private tutoring 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.47 
Attitude Student always finishes homework 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.00 0.01 
Aptitude Student answers homework correctly  0.85 0.84 0.87 0.00 0.00 
N   6724 3845 2879   
Source: Authors’ calculations, from ED 2010 (Aragon Local Education Authority). 
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Table 2: Results of the GBM (Dependent variable P (W=1) 
Variable  Influence 
JobMum2 1.76 
JobMum3 1.23 
JobMum4 2.73 
JobDad2 2.84 
JobDad3 6.76 
JobDad4 1.01 
EducationMum 16.02 
EducationDad 21.08 
ZoneGeo1 0.98 
ZoneGeo2 0.76 
ZoneGeo3 2.08 
ZoneGeo4 2.07 
ZoneGeo5 0.57 
NumBooks 1.91 
Room 5.99 
NumTVs 6.57 
NumPCs 4.51 
NumTvPay 3.58 
NumVideoGames 9.36 
NumMP4 8.20 
Best num iterations 16453.00 
Train R2 0.084 
Test R2 0.045 
% correct prediction 68.4% 
Train fraction 0.5 
Bag 0.5 
Shrinkage factor 0.0005 
Distribution Logistic 
Max num interactions 4 
Max num iterations 20000 
Seed 0 
 
Table 3. Two-group t-test 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Sciences 
Unmatched 526.27 501.97 24.30 2.43 9.99 
ATT 526.27 519.15 7.11 2.72 2.62 
Foreign 
Language 
(English) 
Unmatched 531.50 499.18 32.32 2.40 13.49 
ATT 531.50 518.97 12.53 2.68 4.68 
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Table 4 – Rosenbaum Bounds for Management Benefit Treatment Effects 
Variable γ* P_value critical 
Sciences  1 9.7e-07 
(N=2879 matched pairs) 1.03 .000023 
 1.06 .000329  
 1.09 .002888 
 1.12 .016511 
 1.15 .064211 
 1.18 .177506 
 1.21 .365214  
 1.24 .587657 
Foreign Language (English) 1 2.8e-15 
(N = 2879 matched pairs) 1.03 5.1e-13 
 1.06 5.1e-11 
 1.09 3.0e-09 
 1.12 1.0e-07 
 1.15 2.3e-06  
 1.18 .000033 
 1.21 .00032 
 1.24 .002172 
 1.27 .010623 
 1.30 .038508 
 1.33 .10649 
* gamma: log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
 
Table 5. HLM regression: random effects (3-levels) 
  Science   
Foreign language 
(English) 
  
Null 
model 
Complete 
model 
  
Null 
model 
Complete 
model 
Schools 1805.91 1639.54  3128.13 2061.81 
Classes 1169.27 949.38  379.75 439.40 
Students 6554.70 4528.35  5993.29 4010.39 
Total 9529.88 7117.27  9501.16 6511.61 
ICC(school) 18.9%   32.9%  
ICC(class) 12.3%   4.0%  
% of total variance explained by 
variables 
 25.3%   31.5% 
% of level 1 (students) variance 
explained by variables 
 30.9%   33.1% 
% of level 2 (classes) variance 
explained by variables 
 18.8%   -15.7% 
% of level 3 (schools) variance 
explained by variables 
  9.2%     34.1% 
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Table 6. HLM regression: random effects (2 levels) 
  Science   English 
  
Null 
model 
Complete 
model 
  
Null 
model 
Complete 
model 
Schools 2661.88 2393.96  3373.56 2172.77 
Students 7470.67 5354.93  6466.98 4466.59 
Total 10132.55 7748.90  9840.55 6639.36 
ICC (schools) 26.3%   34.3%  
% of total variance explained by 
variables 
 23.5%   32.5% 
% of level 1 (students) variance 
explained by variables 
 28.3%   30.9% 
% of level 2 (schools) variance 
explained by variables 
  10.1%     35.6% 
 
  
32
Table 7. Estimation of fixed effects with robust standard errors in the HLM 
Two-level model 
Foreign Language (English) 
Three-level model  
Sciences 
School variables (Level 2)  School variables (Level 3) 
Variable Coefficient  Variable Coefficient  
Intercept 976.69*** 
(192.4) 
Intercept 517.63*** 
(172.9) 
SCHTYPE 
(publicly subsidised private primary 
school) 
7.57 
(7.6) 
SCHTYPE 
(publicly subsidised private primary school) 
22.6*** 
(7.8) 
TERUEL province(1) 
Ref: Huesca province 
11.97 
(17.2) 
TERUEL province(1) 
Ref: Huesca province 
2.77 
(12.0) 
ZARAGOZA province(1) 
Ref: Huesca province 
12.27 
(14.9) 
ZARAGOZA province(1) 
Ref: Huesca province 
-10.44 
(16.1) 
Municipality size 
(number inhabitants) 
0.00*** 
(0.0) 
Municipality size 
(number inhabitants) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
ZARAGOZA city -813.51*** 
(315.8) 
ZARAGOZA city -41.17 
(290.4) 
                        Class variables (Level 2) 
PCTGIRLS 
(Percentage girls at school) 
7.52 
(36.1) 
PCTGIRLS 
(Percentage girls in class) 
-32.34 
(43.9) 
PCTREP 
(Percentage repeaters at school) 
54.86 
(74.3) 
PCTREP 
(Percentage repeaters in class) 
6.8 
(53.9) 
PCTMORE5YEARS 
(Percentage of pupils living over 5 
years in Spain at school at school) 
51.11 
(43.2) 
PCTMORE5YEARS 
(Percentage of pupils living over than 5 years in 
Spain at school in class) 
-21.14 
(45.3) 
PCTJOBMUM1 
(Percentage of students whose mother 
is White Collar High Skilled at school) 
49.56 
(49.2) 
PCTJOBMUM1 
(Percentage of students whose mother is white 
collar highly skilled in class) 
10.62 
(23.6) 
PCTJOBMUM2 
(Percentage of students whose mother 
is white collar low skilled at school) 
-30.19 
(37.6) 
PCTJOBMUM2 
(Percentage of students whose mother is white 
collar low skilled at class) 
-4.01 
(25.8) 
PCTJOBMUM3 
(Percentage of students whose mother 
is blue collar highly skilled at school) 
-86.35 
(90.0) 
PCTJOBMUM3 
(Percentage of students whose mother is blue 
collar highly skilled in class) 
-85.6 
(64.4) 
AVEDUCATIONMUM 
(Average number of years of mothers 
education at school) 
8.43** 
(3.9) 
AVEDUCATIONMUM 
(Average number of years of mothers’ 
education ins class) 
1.19 
(3.2) 
Student variables (Level 1) Student variables (Level 1) 
GENDER 
( Female =1) 
20.3*** 
(2.4) 
GENDER 
( Female =1) 
-11.19*** 
(2.4) 
REPEATER 
(If student has repeated any year = 1) 
-39.73*** 
(6.1) 
REPEATER 
(If student has repeated any year = 1) 
-28.72*** 
(6.2) 
JOBMUM1 
(Student’s mother is white collar highly 
skilled) 
11.13*** 
(3.9) 
JOBMUM1 
(Student’s mother is white collar highly skilled) 
11.52*** 
(4.3) 
JOBMUM2 
(Student’s mother is white collar low 
skilled) 
0.88 
(3.2) 
JOBMUM2 
(Student’s mother is white collar low skilled) 
1.15 
(3.5) 
JOBMUM3 
(Student’s mother is blue collar highly 
skilled) 
2.05 
(9.0) 
JOBMUM3 
(Student’s mother is blue collar highly skilled) 
0.2 
(7) 
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Table 7. Estimation of fixed effects with robust standard errors in the HLM (cont) 
  
Two-level model  
Foreign Language (English) 
Three-level model 
Sciences 
Student variables (Level 1)    Student variables (Level 1) 
Variable Coefficient  Variable Coefficient  
JOBDAD1 
(Pupil’s father is white collar highly 
skilled) 
9.19* 
(5.4) 
JOBDAD1 
(Pupil’s father is white collar highly skilled) 
1.6 
(6.5) 
JOBDAD2 
(Student’s father is white collar low 
skilled) 
1.71 
(5.6) 
JOBDAD2 
(Student’s father is white collar low skilled) 
-2.01 
(6.6) 
JOBDAD3 
(Student’s father is blue collar highly 
skilled) 
3.4 
(5.1) 
JOBDAD3 
(Student’s father is blue collar highly skilled) 
1.24 
(6.2) 
EDUCATIONMUM 
(Mother’s years of education) 
1.42*** 
(0.3) 
EDUCATIONMUM 
(Mother’s years of education) 
1.47*** 
(0.3) 
MORE5YEARS 
(Over 5 years living in Spain) 
-8.94 
(6.1) 
MORE5YEARS 
(Over 5 years living in Spain) 
18.74*** 
(6.6) 
NUMBOOKS 
(Over 100 books at home) 
7.22** 
(3.1) 
NUMBOOKS 
(Over 100 books at home) 
13.26*** 
(2.8) 
USEBOOKS 
(Uses books frequently) 
13.75*** 
(3.0) 
USEBOOKS 
(Uses books frequently) 
13.76*** 
(3.2) 
NUMTVs 
(Number of TVs at home) 
-5.24*** 
(1.6) 
NUMTVs 
(Number of TVs at home) 
-6.42*** 
(1.7) 
STUDTIM1 
(2 hours of homework every day) 
-3.54 
(3.4) 
STUDTIM1 
(2 hours studying every day) 
-10.48*** 
(3.5) 
STUDTIM2 
(Over 2 hours studying every day) 
-11.68*** 
(2.6) 
STUDTIM2 
(Over 2 hours studying every day) 
-12.77*** 
(2.6) 
NEEDHELP 
(Student needs help in homework) 
-23.15*** 
(3.1) 
NEEDHELP 
(Student needs help in homework) 
-27.68*** 
(3.5) 
REVPAR1 
(Parents check diary but not homework) 
-2.87 
(4.8) 
REVPAR1 
(Parents check diary but not homework) 
-11.38** 
(5.2) 
REVPAR2 
(Parents check homework but not diary) 
-0.59 
(3.8) 
REVPAR2 
(Parents check homework but not diary) 
-10.11** 
(4.2) 
REVPAR3 
(Parents check both homework and diary) 
-10.92*** 
(3.1) 
REVPAR3 
(Parents check both homework and diary) 
-17.28*** 
(3.6) 
REVTEACHER 
(Private tutoring) 
-18.3*** 
(4.7) 
REVTEACHER 
(Private tutoring) 
-19.97*** 
(4.6) 
ATTITUDE 
(Student always finishes homework) 
9.87 
(6.6) 
ATTITUDE 
(Student always finishes homework) 
17.51** 
(7.4) 
APTITUDE 
(Student answers homework correctly) 
11.79*** 
(4.5) 
APTITUDE 
(Student answer homework correctly) 
17.49*** 
(4.2) 
RELCEN 
(Factor 1) 
4.67*** 
(1.0) 
RELCEN 
(Factor 1) 
-0.12 
(1.4) 
SELFCONF 
(Factor 2) 
21.89*** 
(1.4) 
SELFCONF 
(Factor 2) 
18.87*** 
(1.5) 
PERCAMB 
(Factor 3) 
-4.09*** 
(1.3) 
PERCAMB 
(Factor 3) 
-8.27*** 
(1.3) 
(1) This variable proxies the location of the school in the region of Aragon. This region consists of three provinces: Zaragoza, 
Teruel and Huesca (this last being the category of reference)  
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Figure 1. Boxplot ps scores 
 
 
Figure 2. Propensity score distribution by school type 
a. Full sample b. Matched sample 
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Figure 3. Propensity score matching blocks 
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